Hillary checks out Pranab, and the competition
P. Sainath The Hindu March 18 2011
MUMBAI: “To which industrial or business groups is [Pranab] Mukherjee beholden? Whom will he seek to help through his policies? What are Mukherjee's priorities in the upcoming budget... ?”
“Why was Mukherjee chosen for the finance portfolio over Montek Singh Ahluwalia? How do Mukherjee and Ahluwalia get along?”
These were among the questions U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton posed in a cable to the New Delhi Embassy in September 2009, a few months after Prime Minister Manmohan Singh settled in for a second term. The questions are focussed on India's “New Government Economic Leaders,” particularly on the Finance Minister. They seem to imply that Washington had been expecting either P. Chidambaram to return as Finance Minister or Montek Singh Ahluwalia to be elevated to that post.
“How does Ahluwalia feel about remaining in this position? Which, if any, particular agenda items will he be pushing? Does he get on well with the prime minister?” Also, “What is Mukherjee's relationship with the Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, D.V. Subbarao? How does Subbarao view the removal of Chidambaram from the Minister of Finance slot? What impact has his removal had on relations between the finance ministry and the RBI?”
The September 14, 2009 cable ( 225053: secret/noforn) asks: “What are Mukherjee's primary economic concerns and his views on Prime Minister Singh's economic reform Agenda? How quickly does he plan to pursue these reforms? What is his ability to enact reforms?” The sharp Secretary of State also asks: “What are Mukherjee's views of the US bilateral economic relationship and where does he see the relationship Headed? What areas of cooperation is he eager to advance? How does he see the US-China economic relationship in comparison to the US-India relationship?”
Washington analysts, writes Ms. Clinton to the New Delhi Embassy, “are closely monitoring the newly appointed economic leaders in the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) coalition government. We are interested in their views regarding future economic policy, opportunities for bilateral economic cooperation, and their ability to work together as a cohesive team. As time and resources permit, we would highly value any information on the following topics and questions, and plan to incorporate post reporting into finished analysis for policymakers.” The topics include the attitudes and likely directions of a few Ministers and top officials.
“What policies are Mukherjee and other leaders considering to address the global financial crisis? What does Prime Minister Singh think about Mukherjee's new role as finance minister?”
Ms. Clinton wants to get the measure of Minister for Commerce and Industry Anand Sharma. “Why was Sharma chosen for the job? What are his larger ambitions? Why was [Kamal] Nath moved to the road transport and highways portfolio? What are Nath's views on the change? Does Sharma get along with Mukherjee and Prime Minister Singh?” And also, “What is Sharma's relationship with Ahluwalia?”
Other queries on Mr. Sharma: “What policies does Sharma plan to pursue? How does he view India's trade policies? What are his views on Prime Minister Singh's plans for gradual economic reform? What does he perceive as India's primary trade obstacles? What are Sharma's views on the World Trade Organization (WTO)? How will he approach initial meetings with his counterparts? What does he think of previous Minister of Commerce Kamal Nath's actions over the past five years? How close will Sharma remain to the NAMA-11? Is he willing to begin discussions with the US to advance WTO negotiations? How does Sharma view US-India economic relations?”
“How does Sharma view India's current Foreign Direct Investment guidelines? Which sectors does he plan to open further? Why is he reluctant to open multi-brand retail? What are his views on the special economic zones?”
Satish Sharma aide showed U.S. Embassy employee cash to be used as ‘pay-offs' in confidence vote
Siddharth VaradarajanThe Hindu March 17 2011
‘Two chests containing cash' part of a bigger fund of Rs. 50 crore to Rs. 60 crore.
Five days before the Manmohan Singh government faced a crucial vote of confidence on the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal in 2008, a political aide to Congress leader Satish Sharma showed a U.S. Embassy employee “two chests containing cash” he said was part of a bigger fund of Rs. 50 crore to Rs. 60 crore that the party had assembled to purchase the support of MPs. The aide also claimed the four MPs belonging to Ajit Singh's Rashtriya Lok Dal had already been paid Rs. 10 crore each to ensure they voted the right way on the floor of the Lok Sabha.
In a cable, dated July 17, 2008, sent to the State Department ( 162458: secret), accessed by The Hindu through WikiLeaks, U.S. Charge d'Affaires Steven White wrote about a visit the Embassy's Political Counselor paid to Satish Sharma, who is described as “a Congress Party MP in the Rajya Sabha ... and a close associate of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi considered to be a very close family friend of Sonia Gandhi.”
Mr. Sharma told the U.S. diplomat that he and others in the party were working hard to ensure the government won the confidence vote on July 22. After describing the approaches the Congress leader said had been made to the Bharatiya Janata Party and the Akali Dal, Mr. White drops a bombshell of a revelation:
“Sharma's political aide Nachiketa Kapur mentioned to an Embassy staff member in an aside on July 16 that Ajit Singh's RLD had been paid Rupees 10 crore (about $2.5 million) for each of their four MPs to support the government. Kapur mentioned that money was not an issue at all, but the crucial thing was to ensure that those who took the money would vote for the government.”
Lest this should be construed by the visiting diplomats as an empty boast, Mr. Sharma's aide put his money where his mouth was: “Kapur showed the Embassy employee two chests containing cash and said that around Rupees 50-60 crore (about $25 million) was lying around the house for use as pay-offs.”
Independently, Mr. Sharma told the Political Counselor “that PM Singh and others were trying to work on the Akali Dal (8 votes) through financier Sant Chatwal and others, but unfortunately it did not work out.” He said “the Prime Minister, Sonia Gandhi, and Rahul Gandhi were committed to the nuclear initiative and had conveyed this message clearly to the party.” Efforts were also on to try and get the Shiv Sena to abstain. Further, “Sharma mentioned that he was also exploring the possibility of trying to get former Prime Minister Vajpayee's son-in-law Ranjan Bhattacharya to speak to BJP representatives to try to divide the BJP ranks.”
The cable makes it clear the Congress campaign to buy votes was not confined to the cash-filled war chests that Nachiketa Kapur and Satish Sharma had gathered.
“Another Congress Party insider told PolCouns that Minister of Commerce and Industry Kamal Nath is also helping to spread largesse. ‘Formerly he could only offer small planes as bribes,'” according to this interlocutor, ‘now he can pay for votes with jets.'”
Despite these efforts, the U.S. Embassy concluded that the UPA maintained only a “precarious lead” in the forthcoming confidence vote. “Our best guess at this time show the government maintaining its slim majority with the anticipated vote count at about 273 in favor, 251 opposed, and 19 abstentions.”
The prediction was impressively close to the mark. Prime Minister Singh got 275 votes in favour with 256 against and 10 abstentions.
Just before the vote, the BJP produced cash on the floor of the House and alleged that this was the money the government had used to try and buy the support of MPs. But subsequent investigations ran aground. The secret U.S. Embassy cable, however, is likely to reignite Opposition allegations that bribery was resorted to on a massive scale to ensure the UPA won the 2008 vote of confidence.
The fact that Congress politicians could speak so freely to American diplomats about their bribing spree during the run up to the confidence vote — and that the latter could be so blasé about the subversion of democracy — underlines the all-encompassing but ultimately corrosive nature of the “strategic partnership” the two governments were trying to build.
As for Mr. Kapur, his candid display of crores of rupees to be used by the Congress as “pay offs” for the trust vote was not seen by the U.S. Embassy as compromising his democratic credentials in any way. In November 2008, he was sent to the U.S. under the State Department's I-Vote 2008 programme as an observer for that year's presidential election. “The move to invite international observers”, he wrote in a blog post, “reflects the open and democratic nature of the American society.”
Indian support for Palestine ‘historical rhetorical'
P. Sainath The HinduMarch 18 2011
MUMBAI: U.S. Ambassador to India David Mulford was clear in his assessment of what India's support for Palestine really was about in recent times. In a cable dated September 6, 2005, he spoke of India's “historical rhetorical support for Palestinian statehood (important for domestic politics)” ( 39915: secret/noforn).
“The UPA derives an important portion of its support from India's 150 million Muslims, and it came to power in May 2004 with a stated goal of recalibrating India's relations with the Muslim world, especially on the Palestinian question. Portraying itself as a defender of Muslims in India and a champion of the Palestinian cause, the UPA has made reinvigorating ties with Middle East and Muslim countries a high priority.”
The cable goes on to say: “The second goal is to rally support for India's perennial battle to be admitted in some status to the Organization of the Islamic Conference, which has been critical of India's Kashmir stance. Although both of these goals derive mostly from domestic electoral political considerations, rather than strictly foreign policy objectives, New Delhi has recognized that its lacklustre relations with Arab and Muslim states have become a foreign policy liability, and is working to rectify that.”
It adds: “As part of these broader goals of deeper engagement in the Middle East, New Delhi has floated suggestions recently that it could play a mediating role in the Israel-Palestinian conflict, as a state with growing working relations with Israel and (at least) bona fides in the eyes of Palestinians (Note: Ref C reports on the latest disappointing India-Israel interaction. End Note). However, given its generally weak relations with most Middle Eastern countries and lack of gravitas, most dismiss this vision as unrealistic.”
The cable presents a discussion on the August 10, 2005 visit of West Asia Envoy Chinmaya Gharekhan: “Our contacts tell us that India's prime concern with Syria is for its influence on the Israel-Palestinian conflict, where India is trying to carve out a role for itself, after recognizing New Delhi's increasing marginalization. The other current interest, as illustrated by Gharekhan's recent Damascus visit, is India's desire to find low-risk options for re-engaging on Iraq.”
Nuclear pact: U.S. reads India the riot act over Iran
Siddharth Varadarajan
March 18 2011
According to the cable, sent on September 13, 2005, Mr. Mulford complained to Dr. Rice about the unhelpful attitude of senior Indian officials and advised her to encourage the Prime Minister to “exercise leadership.” He wrote: “In my meetings with the Foreign Minister and Foreign Secretary [Shyam] Saran, I have found them reluctant to acknowledge that Iran could jeopardize both our nuclear initiative and India's regional security interests.”
He urged her to “sketch the real challenges we face in implementing legislative actions necessary for us to fulfill the civil nuclear vision of the July 18 Joint Statement, and to challenge India to take equally difficult steps on relations with Tehran and separation of India's civil and military nuclear facilities.”
The linkage Mr. Mulford made was surprising, for though India had agreed in that Joint Statement to separate its civil and military nuclear facilities, it had not made any commitments on Iran. Nevertheless, he advised Dr. Rice to use her meeting with the Prime Minister and the External Affairs Minister “to encourage the GOI to exercise leadership on this Iran issue, rather than hiding behind the NAM consensus, as happened on UN reform.”
Congressional hearings had already alerted India to the need to stop sitting on the fence on the question of Iran's ‘nuclear weapons program', he wrote. “New Delhi is trying to support us without alienating Tehran, on whom it depends for current oil supplies, future natural gas imports (pipeline and LNG), and access to Afghanistan and Central Asia,” the cable noted. Though India's attachment to Iran could weaken in the long run if it “is able to secure other energy sources (e.g., gas pipeline from Bangladesh) and alternative access routes to Central Asia (e.g., overland transit through Pakistan),” its leaders “must be made to recognize that Congress is watching India's role at the IAEA with great care, and the Indian vote in Vienna will have real consequences for our ability to push ahead on civil nuclear energy cooperation.”
Mr. Mulford said the looming Iran vote at the International Atomic Energy Agency was a “significant early test of India's readiness to exercise the responsibilities of global leadership.” The country felt “squeezed between admonitions from us and pressure from the Iranians.” Under the circumstances, “the Indian instinct will be to lie low and hope that discussions in New York avoid the unpleasant prospect of [an IAEA] vote on September 19. We need to give a clear accounting of these stakes, while also preserving the significant equity that we have built-up in the transforming U.S.-India relationship.”
President Bush and Dr. Rice met the Prime Minister later that day. None of the WikiLeaks India Cables provide a readout of that meeting. But shortly thereafter, instructions were sent to the Indian Ambassador in Vienna to vote in favour of the U.S. resolution at the IAEA censuring Iran.
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